China’s integrated air defenses-based on cheap, sometimes stolen digital technology-are now considered potentially more threatening to the U.S. than Russia’s. The wholesale use of commercial products has made Chinese networks flexible, easy to upgrade and tough to exploit.

That opinion, rapidly taking hold in the U.S. electronic warfare community, is part of the tsunami of air defense ana­lysis following Israel’s demonstration of its ability to shut down Syria’s Russian-built air defenses long enough to conduct a bombing raid-and then allowed the radars to come back on in time to see the Israeli aircraft disappearing over the border (AW&ST Nov. 26, 2007, p. 28).

China’s air defense expenditures are calculated by aerospace officials as only one-tenth of what’s invested by the U.S. The Chinese systems are affordable, in part, because of the regular use of stolen U.S. technology-described as “Cisco in Chinese,” by one specialist. The telecom companies that conduct and exploit the thefts are run by former People’s Liberation Army generals. The low cost allows rapid updating and proliferation of these defenses, which is one of the best ways to confound attack planners.

“The Chinese, like many countries without billions to spend on defense, are figuring out how to leverage all that commercial technology into their military capabilities,” says Rance Walleston, BAE Systems’ director of information operations initiative and information warfare. “We’ve spent a lot of time looking at Chinese technologies. They’re not building many unique devices. Their integrated air defense system [IADS] uses commercial standards,” such as GSM and voice over Internet protocols (VOIP).

The Syrian raid-which involved air-to-ground and network-to-network electronic invasion of a Russian-built IADS-is convincing some that custom-built, highly specialized and expensive air defenses with long development times are decreasing in deterrent value. In fact, they have become victims of their own uniqueness. Because they were hard to develop and field, they aren’t often modified. That gives electronic warriors the time to conduct analysis and build countermeasures.

But last year’s events haven’t changed U.S. government views of the threat.

“A lot of the threat models used to evaluate whether new programs work are outdated,” says a participant in electronic warfare and network attack since the 1992-95 conflict in Bosnia. “They are Soviet-era models. Where are the people who are thinking about what the Chinese IADS really look like? The Israelis are already running up against different defenses now that they’ve highlighted some of the weaknesses in Syria’s air defenses.”

But some senior U.S. Air Force officials disagree.

“The Chinese have been spending significant amounts for years on their IADS, and while they do exploit commercial technologies, they also buy and co-develop advanced missiles and radars with the Russians and others,” says a former top USAF acquisition official. “Network attack has been an integral part of taking down an IADS for years and is integral to all of the major modeling activities.”

U.S. intelligence analysts point out that in air defense, like other areas, China is pursuing multiple paths that include embracing purchased systems as well as developing their own high- and low-end solutions. The same is the case in air defense, they note, where the Chinese are buying Russian systems and also developing their own versions based on what they learn from the acquired systems.

That inability to change quickly also is reflected in U.S. defense acquisition practices. For example, “the U.S. still insists on building a lot of unique radios when they could use the commercial infrastructure and then build their own gear to encrypt it for the last mile [of wireless communications in combat],” the EW specialist says.

“Why spend billions on [joint tactical radios and future combat systems] that they can’t make as well the commercial companies? Why build high-power, aerial standoff jammers when there are cheaper and more sophisticated ways to do that mission with finesse [using lower-power data streams packed with algorithms to disrupt, mislead or take over enemy systems]? If you believe the trend in insurgent or terrorist command and control is toward low-power communications, what is a B-52-based jammer going to do? If I stand off 100 mi., there’s no way I’m going to have any impact on these threats.”